Authoritarian Elites — by Adlai Newson, Francesco Trebbi

Authoritarian Elites — by Adlai Newson, Francesco Trebbi

Authoritarian Elites

NBER Working Paper No. 24966
Issued in August 2018
NBER Program(s):Development Economics, Political Economy

We explore the role of ruling elites in autocratic regimes and provide an assessment of tools useful to clarify the structure of opaque political environments. We first showcase the importance of analyzing autocratic regimes as non-unitary actors by discussing extant work on nondemocracies in Sub-Saharan Africa and China, where the prevailing view of winner-take-all contests can be clearly rejected. We show how specific biographical information about powerful cadres helps shed light upon the composition of the inner circles that empower autocrats. We further provide an application of these methods to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), one of the most personalistic, opaque, and data-poor political regimes in the world today. Employing information from DPRK state media on participants at official state events, we are able to trace the evolution and consolidation of Supreme Leader Kim Jong Un around the transition period following the death of his father, Kim Jong Il. The internal factional divisions of the DPRK are explored during and after this transition. Final general considerations for the future study of the political economy of development are presented.

You may purchase this paper on-line in .pdf format

from ($5) for electronic delivery.

Machine-readable bibliographic record –

Document Object Identifier (DOI): 10.3386/w24966

PublishFinancevia National Bureau of Economic Research Working Papers 3, 2018 at 03:32PM